In the early 1920s, armed anti-Japanese struggle groups in Manchuria moved to integrate the command of each group and reorganize their troops to engage in a more effective anti-Japanese war. An example of a military cooperation agreement between the Western military government and the Northern military government is an example. After military movement to Ando-hyeon, the Seoro military sentiment conveyed the necessity of cooperative operations to the Bukro military sentiment, and the Bukro military sentiment also wanted to unify each other's military sentiment and operations. However, in August, when the Japanese military's subjugation of the Manchurian Independence Army began in earnest, armed groups in each region decided to make military movements to preserve their forces and put them into practice. In May 1920, the troops of the Dodokbu in Choi Jin-dong and the National Council of Choreography joined forces to form the Korean Bukro Dodokgunbu and to defeat a battalion of Japanese troops in the Battle of Bongodong. And in September, he left Myeongwol-gu, which was the base of his activities, with Ando-hyeon as the target point for the march. Meanwhile, Bukro-gun Jeongseo hurriedly finished the graduation ceremony of the Military Academy and tried to join the military sentiment by moving to Ando-hyeon. In addition, the Military Government, the National Assembly, the Righteous Army Department, and the New Civil Corps also initiated military movements to participate in the integration of independence movement military organizations. In early October, executives of each independent military unit met at Samdo Island in Hwaryong-hyeon to discuss countermeasures against the advance of the Japanese military. Thus, according to the claim of Hyeon Cheon-mook, vice president of Bukro-gun sentiment, it was decided to avoid head-on confrontation with the Japanese army, which is far superior to the independent army in terms of troops and firepower. On October 13, five units, including the Korean Independence Army, the National Assembly, the Shinmindan, the Uimindan, and the Hanminhoe, held a joint conference to organize a joint division and General Hong Beom-do was appointed as the general commander. However, while the Bukro Military Government and this Independence Army Allied Division moved, they encountered 12,000 troops in the eastern part of the 19th Division of the Japanese military in Cheongsan-ri, and 10 battles took place from October 21 to 26, which will shine on the history of anti-Japanese independence. Bukro Gunjeongseo, led by Seo Il and Kim Jwa-jin, first launched a second discharge army led by Lee Bum-seok in the Baegunpyeong Valley on the 21st or launched a surprise attack on Yamada infantry under the 19th Division of the Japanese military. At the same time, the Allied Division of the Independence Army, led by Hong Beom-do, camped in Wanru-gu and engaged in a neck-and-neck war with the Japanese military's Dongji, destroying about 400 enemy soldiers. Bukro Military Government, which fought its first battle in Baegunpyeong and marched 64km without a break, attacked a cavalry company in Cheonsupyeong on the 22nd, killing 116 enemy soldiers and occupying the highlands of the Japanese army's 73rd Regiment. At this time, the main unit of the Japanese Dongji joined, surrounding the Bukro military sentiment, and allies were on the defensive, but when Hong Beom-do's joint division joined and helped the Bukro military sentiment to stop the attack, the Japanese army retreated with 1,000 casualties. Hong Beom-do's joint division, which won the battle of Eorangchon by supporting the Northern Road military sentiment, was dispersed into several units to break through the Japanese army's siege. Hong Beom-do's troops defeated the Japanese defense company at Cheonbosan Mountain at dawn on the 25th and arrived at Ando-hyeon, where the Western military government led by Ji Cheong-cheon and the Heungupdan unit of Kim Hyuk were waiting. "You didn't get sick." I'm so glad." "Eorangchon has repelled the Japanese military's main forces and dispersed them into various units. The topography here is unfamiliar to the Japanese military, so it will be impossible to track us anymore." Hong Beom-do and Ji Cheong-cheon briefly discussed the next path of the independent army. In this way, Jeongil-gun and Seo Seo-gun of Hongbeom-do were integrated to name the unit as Korean Volunteer Army, and Hong Beom-do decided to lead the troops as General Commander, Ji Cheong-cheon as Deputy Commander, and Kim Hyuk as the head of the military. However, at this time, Hamhui platoon, a member of the Bukro-gun Office, was separated from the main base after the Battle of Eorangchon and came to the Korean Volunteer Army unit in Ando-hyeon according to the original military movement plan. "Our Bukro military emotional unit has yet to break through the Japanese siege. We have to go and rescue him now." General Hong Beom, who was listening to Ham Hwi's detailed report, also hardened his face. Kim Jwa-jin's Bukro military sentiment killed 10 enemy soldiers and 50 Japanese infantry in Bongmil-gu on the 23rd while moving to Ando Prefecture after the Eorangchon Battle on the 22nd. On the 24th, Xu Gu also encountered 100 Japanese infantry to fight, and on the 24th, a company of enemy troops and white soldiers fought in Cheonbosan Mountain. General Hong Beom-do immediately stood up and ordered various commanders. "There is no time to procrastinate here because Bukro military sentiment is still trapped in the enemy's siege. We will immediately move all troops to support Bukro military sentiment, so hurry up!" Korean volunteer forces loaded guns with ammunition and rushed to Cheongsan-ri like the wind. Thus, on October 26th, during the march, the independent army launched a wave offensive with about 150 Japanese infantry in the Godongha area, the last battle of the Cheongsan-ri Battle. In the Battle of Godongha, which was held in the Battle of Shangae, the independent army took full advantage of the advantageous terrain of thick forests, steep slopes, and small rivers to preemptively attack the Japanese army in order to neutralize the firepower of the Japanese armed with heavy weapons. In fact, these tactics could be said to be a kind of guerrilla war that deals with strong armed forces with weak armed forces and hurts the Japanese while minimizing the sacrifice of independent forces. In the process, Hong Beom-do's troops continued to fight the Japanese army as they retreated in the direction of Hwangguryeongchon, and the military sentiment retreated in the direction of Daemangga-dong, west of Usimsan Mountain, attracting and hitting the enemy. Until now, Cheongsan-ri Battle has been wrongly known in Korea as a battle of the Bukro Military Government alone, where General Kim Jwa-jin is the commander-in-chief, but in fact, General Hong Beom-do, the Dodokbu, the Shinmindan, and the Uidan. If so, let's analyze the Cheongsan-ri Battle in detail, including military common sense. If you look at the map, you can see the valleys such as Cheongsan-ri and Bongo-dong well. Even if it is insufficient, it is worth recalling how the independent army made good use of the geographical conditions at the time. Unfortunately, there is a lack of data to confirm the exact location and surrounding topography of the specific geographical names appearing in the Cheongsan-ri Battle, which seems to be a problem that requires several field trips and considerable research. In addition, it is regrettable that small rivers and roads at the time did not appear. For example, there is a river called Wolsin River in Samdunja, Hwaryonghyeon, but the river does not appear. It is presumed to be a tributary of the Tuman River. It is also regrettable that the Haeran River flowing through Yongjeong-si does not appear. However, it seems to be helpful in vividly grasping the terrain situation. The following maps are paintings from the 1985 Defense Ministry compilation of the Independent Army Uprising. Japan had already established four consulate branches (★) in 1920, and thousands of police troops had been deployed to protect consulates and Japanese residents. They had rights and interests in the Gando region. Kim Jwa-jin's North Road Military Government, which completed military training and unit maintenance in the West Daepa area in 1920, is understood in advance for the Chinese military's punitive actions and conducts base movement. In addition, regarding the invasion of the Japanese army, it finally moves to the Ido-gu area heading toward Cheongsan-ri. This is a picture showing the Japanese military's operational behavior according to the Manchurian Bulryeong Line, Choto Plan. The "block action unit" is surrounding the outskirts. The "Total Action Unit" divides the 19th Division, which has its headquarters in Nanam, into three zones to carry out operations to search and wipe out guerrillas, armed independent forces in the forest area, especially in most important battles with the comrades. The independent army seems to have acted very wisely tactically. In other words, he quickly left the region with rapid mobility against the Japanese siege, and thoroughly beat certain units without confronting the entire Japanese army. Looking closely, only one-third of the Japanese military's actual punitive action unit combat power was engaged. It looks similar to the later Finnish Sotti tactics. In particular, the Japanese military inevitably disperses troops for search, so there is no effect of concentration, and the speed of search and movement of Japanese troops is too slow compared to independent forces. In addition, no matter how closely the Japanese military data are, it can be seen that there are only information activities that have penetrated smuggling, and that the advancement is not effectively utilized when conducting search actions. To be honest, Japan's military power traditionally seems to be a country that is not very good at army tactics.
It is a map of the situation in which the Japanese are lured to the Cheongsan-ri Valley and engaged in battles in Baegunpyeong and Bongmil-gu, and the Japanese are only thoroughly moving along the road, but it can be seen that the independent forces are moving using ridges. At that time, the Japanese army was hiring leather boots as military shoes, and it can be said that it is a bit foolish to have a mountain battle wearing leather boots. It would be good to remember that the independent army secured better mobility in the mountain battle by actively utilizing the mituri (straw god). After the Battle of Baegunpyeong, the independent forces left the battle area faster than the Japanese army's siege network and moved to the Eorangchon area. Considering that it covers about 60km of mountain at night, I think I can feel how powerful physical strength and topography mastery can be in guerrilla warfare. In the case of Bukro Gunjeongseo, which preoccupied Hill 874 near Eorangchon, it seems that it was also an appropriate judgment. It was a short difference with the Japanese military that the Bukro military sentiment quickly decided to preoccupy Hill 874, and it seems to be an excellent action to use about two hours before the Japanese military's main unit arrived here. In the Northern Road Military Government, people with little practical experience were trained through six months of rapid training, and it is surprising that they had this level of perfect behavior regardless of whether they won or lost the battle. Personally, I think the battle of Eorangchon here is the moment when General Kim Jwa-jin's command ability shines the most. 1. Hit a Japanese posterior cavalry company in Cheonsupyeong. 2. The Japanese military's main forces are expected to flood into Cheonsupyeong, and the nearby highland 874 will be preempted in the shortest time. 3. Don't waste 2 hours of time and make the most of it to build a defensive position. The Bukro Military Government continued to move while fighting from the previous day, and it was shortly after the 30-kilometer march. The series of Eorangchon battles were large-scale battles that took place all day long, and considering that all these processes were successfully carried out, I think you can feel that it was a really elite force even if you are not a fool. After the battle of Eorangchon, the independent forces immediately leave the region, and this time, considering using the road along the Godongha River, it can be seen that their physical strength has been exhausted considerably. The six-day battle and rapid march required extreme patience and physical strength that humans could exert, and it seems that they have demonstrated their capabilities to the limit. It is the guerrilla unit that has no external supply and support, recruitment troops, and reserve forces. Rather than carrying out further battles, it can be seen that hitting the enemy as much as possible and leaving the battle area quickly was the best way in the situation at the time. According to the independent newspaper, it describes the physical condition of the members at the time, saying, "I was so hungry that I only thought of getting food even during the battle."
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