Enigma and Ultra -1

 On the morning of August 26, 1914, General Yakov Jilinsky, commander of the Russian Northwest Front Army, sent a series of commands to the first and second armies advancing to East Prussia via radio. At that time, wireless communicators were relatively new equipment for the Russian army, and Zilinsky was able to clearly convey his orders. However, they did not know that the German military had established a radio communication intercepting base. In a few minutes, the German command was able to capture Zilinsky's orders and figure out the size and operation plan of the Russian army. Based on this information, the Germans carried out large-scale military operations, and the Russians lost 250,000 troops in two weeks. This was the beginning of a series of defeats that led to the collapse of Charism three years later.

The Battle of Tannenberg shocked military leaders in Europe. Each country encrypted correspondence at a high speed to protect communication, and intelligence agencies also studied cryptographic analysis technology to decrypt it. As the systems for making codes and codes diversified and techniques developed, it became increasingly difficult to decipher them. However, no matter how sophisticated the ciphers and codes were, there was always a risk of exposure. Each language has its own type, and code decipherers and cryptographers have found these types in coded or encrypted messages. More clever techniques have been developed to hide this type, but this has led to problems. In particular, military communications should not only be able to quickly create codes or passwords, but also be easy to use.

This problem was soon solved in 1915 when an American engineer named Edward Hebern invented an encryption machine. The machine, which looks like a simple typewriter, automatically encrypts the message internally by typing it with a keyboard. The person who received the message just had the same machine and set the same key as the sender, and the machine read the password on its own. At first, the machine was quite crude, but in the 1920s, a Swiss engineer rebuilt it into a more sophisticated form, resulting in the creation of a high-tech machine called Enigma. Initially, Switzerland aimed to commercialize multinational corporations trying to encrypt sensitive internal correspondence, but Germany recognized that the machine could be used for military purposes. Germany bought a patent for machines and began improving the model in 1929, and in 1933, it developed the world's most advanced cryptographic machine. After that, Germany continued to improve Enigma and kept Hitler from selling Enigma commercially.

In early 1929, Gustav Bertrand, head of the French Military Intelligence Agency's wireless communication information department, discovered that Germany had begun to overhaul its military communication system with the introduction of a new cryptographic machine. Cryptographers who saw the ciphertext written by Enigma concluded that the existing method could not be decrypted.

In 1931, Hans Thilo-Schmidt, an employee of the cryptographic management department of the German Supreme Command (OKW), proposed to Henry Navarre, a French officer in Germany, to sell secrets about the new cryptographic machine used by Germany, and Bertrand described Enigma. However, the data alone could not determine the encryption process, and the British Information and Communication Agency (GCHQ) also judged that Enigma code could not be decrypted.