General Lee Kwang from the Han Dynasty of China.

 In November, the first year of Hanmuje Wonkwang (B.C.134), Muje made General Wiwi Lee Gwang as General Hyogi and stationed General Jung Bul-sik as General General of Anmun, respectively. Both Lee Gwang and Jeong Bul-sik were talented people who led the military well and made a reputation at the time as Taesu in the border region. However, the soldiers of Lee Kwang's unit did not have any marching command at all when they started, so there was no distinction between the unit and the department, and they rarely had a proper battle line even during the battle. Even when they were solemn, Yeongchae was installed anywhere with water and grass, and the soldiers' life in the compound was also comfortable, so even during night patrols, the handle was attached as a copper container (which was used to receive food) to take self-defense measures. In addition, even when the command handled military administration, document preparation and bookkeeping were extremely simplified. However, Lee Kwang was dispatched as far away as the scouts, so the troops had never been damaged by the surprise attack of the Huno people. On the contrary, Jeong Bul-sik's military kept the unit department and marching crew in order and solemn, strengthened their alertness even during night patrols, and stayed up all night writing accurate documents and books. The soldiers of the unit were busy with no time to rest properly because of this, but they had never been damaged by the sudden attack of the Hun. Jeong Bul-sik evaluated Lee Kwang's unit leadership policy in this way. "Lee Gwang's incidental management is very simple and simple. However, once the enemy is invaded by surprise, there will be no way to stop it, but his soldiers will be willing to give their lives for the sake of glory because their military life is comfortable and enjoyable. On the other hand, my unit management policy is complicated and harsh, but the enemy will not be able to rush into our unit." Jeong Bul-sik judged that Lee Kwang's troops would be vulnerable to redemption, but the Hunno people were more afraid of Lee Kwang's strategic tactics than Jeong Bul-sik, and the soldiers were also willing to follow Lee Kwang's command order. Jeong Bul-sik's subordinates suffered much more than Lee Kwang's subordinates. When Lee Kwang worked as a superior sergeant (June 144, B.C.). At one time, Muje's trusted internal official was enlisted in Lee Kwang's unit to tour his military training methods and tactics to attack Hunno. When the battle broke out with the Hunno Army, the officials released 2.30 cavalry and launched an attack together. He found three Hunno soldiers and fought a neck-and-neck race, but three Hunno soldiers fired shots at their officials, injuring them, and exterminating their cavalry. The innermost officer hurriedly fled to Lee Kwang's camp and returned. Seeing that, Lee Kwang told the innermost official. "The three Hunno soldiers must be the ones who shot and caught large eagles!" And they were dispatched with 100 pro-crisis soldiers and began to chase them. Lee Kwang chased dozens of bad old soldiers of the three, killing two people himself and capturing the other one. Indeed, the prisoner was a person who shot an eagle and used shooting and bravery. When I climbed up the horse with the prisoners tied up, thousands of famine soldiers flocked. However, when the Hunno army discovered that Lee Kwang had only 100 units, they misunderstood that he was attempting a manned operation, so everyone was greatly surprised and crawled up the mountain to be ready for battle. Lee Kwang's 100 pro-crisis soldiers were also very surprised by the military power of the Hunno Army and hurriedly tried to run away. At this time, Lee Kwang stopped his subordinates. "We're dozens of miles away from what we've seen now. Now, if we start running away with only 100 troops, the Hunno Army will follow without delay and shoot and kill them in detail. But if we are holding out here, the Hunno Army will misunderstand us as bait that attracts us and will not be able to attempt an attack hastily." And Lee Kwang ordered all of them to advance. The cavalry advanced to Jinji 2-ri, Hunno-gun and stopped again. Lee Kwang also ordered everyone to get off the horse and massage the saddle. The pro-crisis soldiers were afraid of getting off the horse in the enemy battle, so they suggested Lee Kwang to retreat. "There are a lot of enemies. And because it's so close to us, what if a sudden attack is made?" replied Lee Kwang. "The enemy will know that we will run away. However, if all of us get off our horses and release the saddle, we will be deeply trusted by our army's manned bait and refrain from attacking." Thus, as Lee Gwang predicted, the Hunno army dared not come down from the mountain and attack, and a general from the Hunno side on a white horse appeared and began to explore Lee Gwang-gun's sympathy. Lee Kwang immediately climbed up the horse and ran out with about 10 close aides and killed the general and returned. Then, he released the saddle again and instructed the soldiers to lay down in the field and take a rest. When Lee Kwang-gun showed no signs of moving until sunset that day, the serfs did not attempt to attack, wondering what strategy they were planning. Soon after, when the night came, Hunno-gun came down from the mountain with all the troops and withdrew to the road, fearing that a soldier who might be lurking in a nearby mountain might conduct a night attack, and Lee Gwang was able to return safely. Daegye (a scholar during the Namsong period) commented on Lee Gwang like this. Lee Gwang's courage is so great that there is no one in the world to compete with. During his 40 years of service as a general guarding the surrounding town, he fought 70 battles with the Hunno people, but there was nothing to record for securing northern safety, and he killed himself after failing in the final operation, so all of them had no discipline in military leadership. However, both Lee Kwang's simplified unit management and Jeong Bul-sik's overly complicated unit management were errors. If military management is excessively simplified, soldiers become complacent and negligent, losing their vigilance and making mistakes, and there is no way to respond appropriately in the event of an emergency. On the contrary, if it is too crowded, the soldiers will be tired and tired, and the command command system will be noisy, making it impossible to implement operational orders in a timely manner, and even before the operational situation takes place. Therefore, it is only best to choose between simplicity and bustling and implementation. If you have to choose only one side because it is inevitable, it is better to choose a method of infidelity. Lee Kwang's auxiliary management method is not something to imitate at all.