There is luck in war.

Sick death: Winning or losing is a common occurrence in wars, and the lower article is published by Shin Jae-ho, who wrote during the 1996 Hightel World War II Research Society. I deleted some parts of the small sun that I thought were unnecessary. However, I don't think the reliability of the lower text is poor because it doesn't mean that the content itself has deteriorated. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ It was the tribute of the Kitan army that Kang Gam-chan destroyed by hand. It is a tribute or a yanggong, which was separately operated by the Khitan army to cover up the main construction, not the main unit. It is a huge strategic mistake for the Goryeo army to miss the main unit of the Kitan army in Samgyocheon Stream. I'm going to answer this question in 1996, a long time ago, when I was at the World War II Institute of Hytel. I didn't know when I just read Dongguk Syeonggam or Goryeo envoy without thinking, but when I saw the "Yeoyo War History" from the entire Ministry of National Defense, I felt a little disgusted. I heard that you killed all the Kitan troops by blocking Samgyocheon with leather and bursting it.Doesn't the war continue after that? I've been wondering since I was a kid, and it actually failed to capture the main force of the Khitan army. The main unit of the Khitan army bypassed the Goryeo army and safely descended to the upper stream of the Cheongcheongang River, and Kang Gam-chan wiped out the main force by hand at Samgyocheon Stream. In other words, the main force of the Goryeo army of about 200,000 troops was deployed in the north of the Cheongcheongang River, and the main force of the Kitan army of the small back pressure bypassed it and advanced deep to the southward. At that time, all the main forces of the Goryeo army were dispatched to the northern part of the Cheongcheongang River, and there was no decent Goryeo army in the rear part of Kaesong. In a hurry, some Goryeo troops trace the small abdominal pressure and follow it south. It was a crisis, but ``The Quran outposts have been intercepted by a small number of allies in the northern part of Gaeseong, and the Quran troops will return to their posts.'' Rather, if the Xiaobae pressure had gone straight to Gaeseong, the attack might have been successful. Wouldn't it have been more advantageous if the capital was occupied (although there was a center of consideration for the king rather than the system, the king, but if the king were to flee?) If it was close to Kaesong anyway, it would have been better to attack Kaesong with a small backpressure. Given the fact that there was no clear chance of victory, fighting in Kaesong would have been a huge burden on the withdrawal of the Goryeo army, but in fact, the Goryeo army did not have any real reserve forces near Kaesong. In other words, there would have been no difference between occupying Kaesong and regaining troops, or just regaining troops, or preserving the power of the Khitan army. I mean, the small back pressure was also a problem. Of course, 1,000 years later, it's easy to argue on a desk like, "I wouldn't have done it," but in fact, small backpressure would have been a lot of trouble. Let's also look at the Battle of Guizhou, the Battle of Guizhou. If you look at the history of the Yeoyo War from the Ministry of National Defense, you can see a map, and the Goryeo army spreads three sides. The Y-shaped river runs along the river, and the access road is also Y-shaped. The Goryeo army is blocking the top two places of the Y-shape and approaching from the bottom (actually, slightly tilted to the left) as the small back pressure recedes. Immediately after that small back-pressure force, the Goryeo army pursues and continues to attack the rear of the small back-pressure unit. Isn't it amazing?At the center of the Y-shape, the Goryeo army besieges and attacks the Kitan army on three sides. The elite Yonara armies of the Uppisil Army, the Left-Pisil Army, etc. of the reversal are destroyed. It's a really exhilarating moment. In fact, it is rare in our history to determine the victory or defeat by making a great turn among the main forces in the field, not based on a certain castle. Machiavelli distinguishes between countries that can fight in the field and countries that can fight defense in the castle, and evaluates them as different nationalities. Now, in this three-sided siege, some of the Kitan army breaks through the siege. Escape to the upper right of Y. This is actually a problem. To miss the leadership of the enemy in a siege of this level... Anyway, Kang Gam-chan makes two mistakes. First of all, he was deceived by the enemy's attack and failed to capture the main force. It didn't really matter the result, but it was a really dangerous mistake. the escape of the enemy's command from a second exquisitely formed encircle The enemy was a cavalryman and could not escape from this state to the mountains. There was only a narrow passage along the river, but it's a problem that you missed it. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The second clip shows the famous Battle of Guizhou: (Shin Jae-ho says) A three-sided siege was formed by the Goryeo army, which was originally stationed in Guizhou Province, and the Goryeo army, which was chasing in Taeju and Jeongju-myeon. It's a pleasant battle where you didn't just wait in the castle, but you came out of the castle and blocked and annihilated the Khitan army, which was retreating. But it's a bit of a waste to miss bovine pressure. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- What if the Gitan army saw through or ignored the reality of the raid and continued to advance? The disgrace of Samjeondo may have happened earlier... Well, 'if' in history is useless. Conclusion: 1. War has its own luck.          2. Battle of Guizhou, it's exhilarating.          3. Luck skills.