How Did Sedentary Societies Manage to Defeat Nomadic Peoples?

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How Did Sedentary Societies Manage to Defeat Nomadic Peoples?

– Survival Strategies Through the Cases of Han China, Rome, Hungary, and the Mongols

Mounted nomadic warriors galloping across the steppe,
and farming kingdoms plowing fields behind city walls.

Once human history moved into the era of full-fledged “states,”
a clash between these two lifestyles was almost inevitable.

• Nomadic peoples held mobile assets like horses, livestock, and furs,

• While sedentary peoples controlled fixed assets such as grain, textiles, and metalwork.

The friction point was the terms of trade.
From the perspective of settled societies, nomadic goods were often “nice to have, but not strictly essential.”
From the nomads’ perspective, however, agrarian products like grain, cloth, and iron tools were very close to a lifeline.

Because of this imbalance, disputes over trade very often escalated into:

Trade conflicts → Raiding and war.

On top of this, climate acted as an additional variable.

Recent research suggests that when the Huns (often regarded as the western offshoot of the Xiongnu) began battering the borders of the Roman Empire, the severe droughts and climatic instability of the 430s overlapped with this process. ([University of Cambridge][1])
As their means of subsistence collapsed, they effectively chose to “move with sword in hand.”

Anyone who has played the strategy game Civilization V will know exactly what this feels like in game terms: Attila the Hun’s early-game aggression is absolutely terrifying. The designers effectively turned that historical sense of desperation into raw in-game aggressiveness.

The expansion of the Mongol Empire shows a similar pattern.
There is research indicating that a period of heavy rainfall and high grass productivity in the Central Asian interior deserts coincides with the period of Mongol expansion. ([ScienceDirect][2])
When there is more grass for the horses, the mobility and long-range operational capacity of a nomadic army naturally increase.

So let’s go back to our core question:

Under what conditions could an agrarian, sedentary state avoid being overwhelmed by nomadic powers, survive, and even claim to have “won”?

Drawing on historical examples, we can organize the answer into three stages:

① How to prevent war from breaking out in the first place →
② How to split and co-opt nomadic powers →
③ If you absolutely must fight, how to avoid losing and sometimes even win.

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1. The Best Outcome Is Not “Winning,” but “Preventing War”

1-1. From the Nomads’ Perspective, War Is a “Risky Investment”

Even when nomadic confederations use powerful cavalry to invade a sedentary state,
war itself is a high-risk gamble for them.

• Even if they win a battle, if they can’t break into the grain stores behind city walls, the gains are limited;

• If they lose, they may forfeit horses, livestock, and warriors, risking the collapse of the entire tribe.

So nomadic powers generally seek one of three outcomes:

1. “Tributary relations” – a system where they regularly receive grain, silk, silver, etc.

2. “Favorable trade terms” – obtaining cheap grain and silk through border markets (the chekmen / frontier markets).

3. Short-term raids – “hit-and-run” campaigns during climatic crises or political vacuums.

If the first two are reasonably satisfied,
the nomadic confederation has less incentive to risk everything in a full-scale war against a single state.

1-2. Han China’s Heqin Policy and Managed Truces

Early relations between Han China and the Xiongnu are a classic example.

During the period when the Han frontier defenses were incomplete and Xiongnu cavalry was at its peak,
the Han court sent princesses in marriage alliances (heqin, 和親) and provided huge quantities of silk and grain to buy time. ([ResearchGate][3])

From a modern viewpoint this can look like “humiliating tribute,” but:

• While they were doing this, the Han were also fortifying their frontier defenses,

• Preparing to seize control of the Silk Road routes to the Western Regions,

• And building up their internal economic strength.

In other words, it functioned as a kind of “purchased peace”—an insurance premium.

1-3. A Strategy for Buffering Climatic and Economic Stress

Research on the interaction between the Huns and Rome also points to severe climatic and economic stress.

Droughts in the Danube region between the 4th and 5th centuries appear to have hit both the Huns and Roman frontier populations hard, and the Huns responded with frequent raids and pressure. ([University of Cambridge][1])

In such circumstances, if a sedentary state provides nomadic groups with at least a minimal “survival mechanism,” there is a chance tensions can be channeled away from war and toward regulated trade or mercenary contracts.

To summarize:

Stage 1 victory for a sedentary state = “Avoiding war by giving nomads fewer reasons to draw their swords.”

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2. If War Is Unavoidable, “Split and Draw Them In”

At some point, however, war does break out.

At that point, the smartest move for a sedentary state is to split the nomadic confederation from within.

Nomadic empires and confederations tend to have these traits:

• When faced with a strong, obvious external threat, they can unite very quickly;

• But if war drags on or spoils decline, competition and division among the constituent tribes rise to the surface almost immediately.

One of the most effective uses of this structure can be seen in Han China vs. the Xiongnu.

2-1. After Emperor Wu: From All-Out Offensive to Division Strategy

Under Emperor Wu of Han, the empire poured enormous financial and human resources into large-scale campaigns against the Xiongnu. ([위키백과][4])
Economically, the Han state came close to being exhausted,
but in the process they stripped away Xiongnu bases and alliances one by one.

The core of this offensive was not just winning battles. It also involved:

• Planting Han-controlled commanderies and colonies in the frontier, and

• Cultivating pro-Han factions within the Xiongnu,

• Ultimately encouraging a split of the Xiongnu confederation into Southern and Northern Xiongnu. ([Open Research Repository][5])

In short:

“Break them with a frontal blow, then split them, defeat each part separately, and turn some into our allies.”

2-2. Creating “Our Nomads”

The ideal scenario for a sedentary state is:

• To turn certain nomadic groups into military partners of the empire or frontier defense forces.

In practice:

• Chinese history contains many cases where northern nomadic or semi-nomadic groups were absorbed as “border troops” (藩兵) or cavalry units;

• The Roman Empire accepted Germanic and Hunnic groups as foederati (allied troops) and used them to defend its frontiers.

Once this stage is reached, the nomadic confederation is no longer

“A single external enemy,”

but rather

“Multiple fragmented groups, some of whom are on our payroll.”

From the perspective of the sedentary state, the burden of fighting a unified external enemy is greatly reduced.

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3. When You Actually Have to Fight: Cavalry vs. Infantry, Who Wins?

Sometimes diplomacy and politics are not enough,
and full-scale field battles become unavoidable.

One of the most famous examples is the Battle of Carrhae: Rome vs. Parthia.

3-1. The Battle of Carrhae: Disaster for Infantry Without Cavalry

In 53 BCE, Crassus—Rome’s wealthy magnate—invaded Parthian territory in pursuit of glory and wealth.
The result was the catastrophic defeat at Carrhae. ([위키백과][6])

• The Roman army: centered on heavy infantry legions with insufficient cavalry.

• The Parthian army: a combination of mounted archers and heavy cavalry (cataphracts).

On the flat plains of Mesopotamia, Roman infantry:

• Were subjected to relentless arrow fire from mounted archers, and

• Whenever their formations wavered, they were smashed by heavy cavalry charges.

They were effectively annihilated without being able to counterattack properly.
This battle is an extreme demonstration of the rule:

“On open plains, without cavalry and long-range firepower, infantry have no good answer to nomadic/steppe cavalry.”

3-2. Hungary vs. the Mongols: Lacking Infantry–Cavalry Balance and Fortifications

In the early 1200s, as the Mongol Empire expanded into Europe,
the Battle of Mohi (1241) against the Kingdom of Hungary presents a similar lesson. ([위키백과][7])

Hungary possessed one of the most formidable cavalry forces in Europe at the time, but:

• Early strategic mistakes,

• Poor choice of battlefield,

• And, crucially, a weak network of stone fortifications on the Hungarian plain
  (partly because Hungarian kings had long restricted the construction of private castles by the nobility for political reasons) ([위키백과][7])

all contributed to a crushing defeat at the hands of the Mongols.

After this experience, Hungary drastically changed its national defense strategy by heavily promoting stone fortress construction.
Subsequently, the Mongols never again swept across Europe at a similar scale, and Europe developed increasingly dense systems of:

“Fortifications + cavalry/infantry + missile/ artillery defenses.”

3-3. Military Conditions for Sedentary States to Beat Nomadic Cavalry

Summarizing historical cases, the conditions under which a sedentary state could hold its own—and sometimes win—against nomadic forces in the field were roughly:

1. Integrated use of cavalry + infantry + long-range firepower (archers / artillery / siege engines)

   • Infantry: form shield walls and spear lines to blunt enemy cavalry charges.

   • Archers / crossbowmen / artillery: block or disrupt enemy cavalry’s approach.

   • Cavalry: protect the flanks of friendly infantry, and execute counter-encirclement and pursuit.

2. Choice of terrain

   • Avoid direct confrontation on wide, open plains when possible.

   • Choose battlefields anchored on rivers, marshes, hills, or fortifications
     to limit the mobility advantage of nomadic cavalry.

3. Networks of fortifications and supply

   • Even if they lose a field battle, forces can fall back, regroup, and counterattack around strongholds.

   • Ringing grain-rich regions with fortresses ensures the enemy cannot maintain long campaigns without supply.

In modern gaming terms, this is very close to a question of:

“How do you build a team composition that blends solid front-line (infantry), mobility (cavalry), and long-range poke (archers/artillery) in a balanced way?”

No single arm can dominate on its own.
What matters is how each role covers the others’ weaknesses as part of a larger whole.

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4. Bonus Factors: Climate, Fortifications, and “Assimilation”

4-1. Climate: The Invisible Hand Behind the Rise and Fall of Nomadic Empires

As briefly mentioned earlier, recent research suggests that:

• The rapid rise of the Mongol Empire is linked to wetter conditions on the steppe and increased grass productivity; ([ScienceDirect][2])

• During the 1241 Mongol invasion of Hungary, warm and dry weather favored Mongol cavalry,
  while the following year’s sudden cold and heavy rainfall hampered their operations. ([MIT News][8])

In other words, no matter how clever the strategy of a sedentary state may be,
if climate shifts decisively in favor of nomads, defense becomes dramatically more difficult.
Conversely, abrupt climatic changes can also make it nearly impossible for nomadic powers to sustain long-distance campaigns.

4-2. Fortresses and Cities: “The Final Line of Defense and the Graveyard of Nomadic Armies”

Compared to the vast regions the Mongols conquered across Eurasia,
the areas they failed to completely subjugate tend to share a common set of features:

• Dense networks of strong fortifications,

• Mountainous terrain, and

• Maritime barriers.

Examples include:

• Japan: typhoons (“divine winds”) and the difficulty of maritime logistics.

• Mamluk Egypt: strong cavalry and military slave system combined with the Nile and fortified cities.

• Some European regions: high density of fortifications and mountain/river terrain favoring defense.

When a sedentary state:

1. Builds a dense network of fortresses and cities;

2. And successfully operates cavalry, infantry, finances, and logistics within that system,

nomadic armies may score a spectacular early victory,
but run into severe difficulties in long-term occupation and administration.

4-3. Assimilation: Turning “Enemy Limbs” into “Imperial Arms and Legs”

The final stage is this:

“Bring the nomads fully into the system of the state.”

In Chinese history:

• Northern nomadic groups repeatedly end up either founding dynasties in China proper (Northern Wei, Liao, Jin, Yuan, Qing, etc.),
  or being absorbed into existing dynasties as officials and military elites. ([Oxford Research Encyclopedia][9])

In the Roman case:

• Germanic and Hunnic groups were first accepted as allied troops and frontier defenders,
  and eventually the Western Roman Empire itself effectively passed into the hands of Germanic generals.

When this assimilation proceeds smoothly,
the empire gains new mobility and reinforced border defenses.

But if control fails, the process can end with:

“The heart of the empire falling into the hands of elites of nomadic origin.”

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5. Conclusion: What It Really Meant to “Defeat” Nomadic Peoples

Looking across history, the situations in which sedentary states can truly be said to have “defeated” nomadic powers usually share the following conditions:

1. They replaced war with managed trade and tributary structures, giving nomads a reason not to draw their swords.

2. When war was unavoidable, they split and played off nomadic confederations against each other and drew some tribes over to their own side.

3. When it was clear they would lose in the field and be forced into temporary retreat,
   they sometimes resorted to scorched-earth tactics, denying even the opportunity for effective plunder.

4. They built a military system capable of integrated use of cavalry, infantry, and long-range firepower,
   and used fortifications, terrain, and supply lines to neutralize the mobility advantage of nomadic cavalry.

5. Over the long term, they absorbed nomadic groups as allies, border troops, or ruling elites,
   transforming them from an external enemy into internal participants in the imperial system.

In that sense, for sedentary states, “defeating” nomadic peoples rarely meant simple battlefield domination.
More often, it meant successfully managing and re-embedding nomadic powers within a broader political, economic, and military system.

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[1]: University of Cambridge – Evidence for severe drought and Hunnic incursions in the 430s
[2]: ScienceDirect – Climate variability and the expansion of the Mongol Empire
[3]: ResearchGate – Han–Xiongnu relations and the heqin policy
[4]: Wikipedia – Han–Xiongnu War
[5]: Open Research Repository – The division of the Xiongnu and Han frontier policy
[6]: Wikipedia – Battle of Carrhae
[7]: Wikipedia – Battle of Mohi and fortifications in medieval Hungary
[8]: MIT News – Climate analysis of the Mongol invasions of Europe
[9]: Oxford Research Encyclopedia – Nomadic empires and China