Since King Yeongjo, who was born in a humble body and lacked legitimacy, became the support of Noron, he appointed Soron and some men to prevent Noron's one-party premise, not a policy proposed for the country. And it was nothing more than a formal policy that could never be a solution to the party dispute, as it was merely a coercive press on the confrontation of the bungdang with the royal authority. The dissolution of political instability as a result of the Tangpyeong policy was also an anachronistic result obtained by strengthening Neo-Confucianism. In addition, due to the implementation of the Tangpyeong policy, the ruling class tends to step back, shut their mouths, and tie their tongues on their own instead of distinguishing between Jeongsa, which eventually led to an unresponsive tax politics. (In 1800, the year of King Sunjo's accession, farmers attacked and burned government offices in Gyeongsang Province, which can be said to be an eloquent statement of how old and vain the Tangpyeong policy was.)
President Moon Jae In, who was elected in the 2017 Korean presidential election, also did not use his own person as part of the Tangpyeong policy in the early days of his inauguration. The theoretical purpose was good, but so was the appointment of Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-yeol, who could have been talked about and made a mistake for a long time. In the end, it brought about a traitor.
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